SANS ISC: Unidentified Scanning Activity - SANS Internet Storm Center

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Over the two weeks, my honeypot has captured a new scan. According for the URL targeted and some research, this might be used to identify Dahua[1] or HiSilicon[2] digital video recorder (DVR) product. So for I have only seen this activity against port 80 and the scans for this activity looks like this:

20190907-090937: 192.168.25.9:80-XXX.190.6.228:48968 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'
20190907-093912: 192.168.25.9:80-XXX.188.126.243:36847 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'
20190907-094441: 192.168.25.9:80-XXX.189.237.44:44343 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'
20190907-100443: 192.168.25.9:80-XXX.188.40.103:35067 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'
20190907-115225: 192.168.25.9:80-XXX.177.116.123:40904 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'
20190907-115630: 192.168.25.9:80-XX.186.174.54:57636 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'
20190907-122646: 192.168.25.9:80-XXX.189.27.141:38624 data 'GET ../../mnt/custom/ProductDefinition HTTP\r\n\r\n'

If you are seeing this kind of activity and are able to help identify the product targeted or confirm it is one of the 2 I listed, leave a comment on our page. I did find an exploit against HiSilicon DVR released last year searching for the same URL[3].

Update 1

I received the following update via Twitter:

GreyNoise Intelligence (@GreyNoiselO) has observed a very large spike in compromised Mirai-infected devices around the Internet bruteforcing DVR/IP camera devices using the NETsurveillance ActiveX plugin. This activity is originating from roughly 7% of total Mirai infects tracked by GreyNoise.

@MasafumiNegishi has observed the following port being scanned for the same activity: TCP: 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 88, 8000, 8080, 8081, 9090 and being another moobot variant has been scanning Hisilicon DVR device on 80/tcp since August 29. Both moobot variants share same C2.

[1] https://www.dahuasecurity.com/
[2] http://www.hisilicon.com
[3] https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44004

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Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My Handler Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu