@ChrisJohnRiley |
If you can guess where PHPmyAdmin is installed, then so can attackers. |
@DavidJBianco |
You are already pwn3d. The question is, "What will you do about it?" |
@Keldr1n |
Don't leave default passwords on the administrative interfaces of your 3rd party web applications. |
@Keldr1n |
Know your network - and all devices in it - well enough to spot unusual activity. |
@Keldr1n |
Users are almost always the weakest link. Make it a priority to educate them. Do most of yours even know what phishing is? |
@averagesecguy |
Security 101: If you don't need it, turn it off. |
@bowlesmatt |
Passphrases are the new passwords. Make a sentence that is long, hard to guess, and easy to remember. ihatepasswordsseewhatididthere? |
@bowlesmatt |
Patch your systems and disable any unused services to reduce attack surface. |
@bradshoop |
Never trust a host you can't trust. |
@bradshoop |
Computers remember a lot. Even more if you contact security personnel before you reboot. |
@bradshoop |
Dedicate personnel to prevention AND detection. Preferably the same personnel in rotation to breed familiarity and contempt. |
@connellyuni |
It's more important to know what you don't know than it is to know what you do know. |
@cutaway |
Try to avoid saying "We are investigating... why equipment that we have a destruction certificate for was... sold online" to the media. |
@cutaway |
Assets using secure authentication are directly and adversely impacted by your assets using plain text authentication. |
@cutaway |
Complacency: 1) Self-satisfaction especially when accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies. 2) You will be hacked. |
@cutaway |
Default SSL Certs for internal management interfaces should be replaced with valid certificates associated with the organization. |
@cutaway |
Don't be afraid of your incident response plan. Conducting investigations will give your team experience and eventually reduce costs. |
@cutaway |
How do you "Find Evil" in your organization? Seriously, go "Find Evil" and report back to me. |
@cutaway |
IT environments are complex systems. They require a System Development Life Cycle to effectively manage AND secure. |
@cutaway |
If your product allows remote connections somebody WILL write a python/perl/ruby script to connect to it and send whatever THEY want. |
@cutaway |
Monitor and alert to new accounts and accounts being added to Domain Administrator, SUDO, or root groups. |
@cutaway |
Product certification does not mean it has been deployed correctly. Review placement, logging, access, input validation, etc... |
@cutaway |
Service accounts should adhere to corporate password policies and be monitored for modifications including lockout. |
@eternalsecurity |
Make sure you're protecting the right thing. A belt AND suspenders doesn't help if you're not wearing pants. |
@hal_pomeranz |
"A backup is not a backup until you do a restore." #sysadminkoan |
@hy2jinx |
Attack vectors and regulatory requirements change. "That's how we've always done it" is a poor and lazy excuse. |
@hy2jinx |
Scanner "infos" can turn up bigger issues than you'd guess. Look at overall results, not just singles. |
@hy2jinx |
Five missing patches across 100 devices does not equal "five vulnerabilities." |
@hy2jinx |
It's cheaper to consult a security professional from conception than mere days before "go live." |
@hy2jinx |
Security professionals should be empowered to point the business towards good decisions and reserve the power of "No" for a last resort. |
@itinsecurity |
In your encryption system, your key is the weakest link. If it isn't, you're doing it wrong. |
@itinsecurity |
Security is not a box you buy or an app you write. It's an emergent property, a sum greater than its parts. |
@jarocki |
"Dear User: Millions of $$ of software won't keep you from clicking that link. Only YOU can prevent link clicking." |
@jarocki |
When it comes to security controls, Trust But Verify... nah, forget the Trust... just Verify. |
@jimmyzatl |
If you don't log "accepts" in your FW logs for admin protocols you will have no way of knowing when those accounts are abused. |
@jimmyzatl |
An encryption algorithm that has to be hid from the public is by definition a weak algorithm... |
@ken5m1th |
That successful PCI DSS Report On Compliance will not save you from Zombies. |
@kentonsmith |
When setting up any new system, Step 1: Change default admin password. |
@kill9core |
Security through obscurity, or the practice of hiding flaws hoping they won't be found, has proven time and time again not to work. |
@mattdoterasmus |
Just because your security teams work from 9-5, doesn't mean attackers aren't looking the rest of the time. |
@omegadefence |
The attitude that "it won't or can't happen to us" because "we're too small/big/have nothing to offer" is dangerous. |
@omegadefence |
The attitude that "I can't do anything about it so I won't even bother with security or reporting" is also dangerous. |
@omegadefence |
Analyse your logs in detail, it is those with their heads buried in your logs that hold the key to prevent, detect and recover. |
@omegadefence |
Give only the permissions required to do the normal daily duties, nothing more. Special logons for special occasions. |
@omegadefence |
Best: using high-speed trend analysis with custom searches as well as automated reporting AND followup. |
@rob_bainbridge |
Security teams that work in isolation and without transparency will fail. Collaborate with other risk mgmt - audit, ops risk, etc... |
@tccroninv |
Those that store passwords in plain-text invite catastrophe. |
@tliston |
"We can't implement strong passwords/two-factor authentication. Our users aren't capable," says more about your competence than theirs. |
@tliston |
Developers: Never roll your own encryption, authentication or session management schemes. You're not that smart. Trust me. |
@tliston |
If you don't have written authorization to perform security-type testing in your organization, don't. You're too pretty for prison. |
@tliston |
If you're not putting as much thought into your outbound firewall rules as you are for your inbound rules, you're doing it wrong. |
@tliston |
If you're not supporting a legacy Windows OS, for the love of all that is Holy, turn off LANMAN hashes. |
@tliston |
If you've never tested restoring from your backups, then you don't have backups - you have a crapload of data and hope. |
@tliston |
If your internal security posture is based on,"our employees wouldn't know how to do that," then you're likely already 0wned. |
@tliston |
Remember: As an attacker, I exploit misplaced trust. There's nothing mystical or magical about it. |
@tliston |
Run scans against your network. It's the only way to really know what's out there. I've yet to see a fully accurate network diagram. |
@tliston |
Sanity check security spending. A $500 lock on a cheap wood door doesn't buy security. It just gives a thief something to laugh at. |
@tliston |
Security isn't just about preventing compromise. It's about maintaining confidentiality, integrity & availability despite compromise. |
@tliston |
Security-through-obscurity doesn't work against anything with intelligence, but there's lots of dumb sh*t out on the 'net. |
@tliston |
Taking nude photos of yourself? Don't store them on an always-connected device with little-to-no security. #forscarlett |
@tliston |
Teach your users not to click on unknown links. DON'T send links to your users in email. More info: http://t.co/bdNTRI3O |
@tliston |
Web developers: Give the exact same answer whether you're given a bogus username or password on logins. EXACT. SAME. ANSWER. |
@tliston |
WebApp Devs: Just because you have a <SELECT> with A, B, C, & D as options doesn't mean you'll only ever get A, B, C, or D back. |
@tliston |
Webhosting Companies: Web servers shouldn't be making many *outbound* connections. TCPDump is your friend. |
@tliston |
Your organization's AUP should explicitly prohibit Copyright abuse. You do HAVE an Acceptable Use Policy, right? |
@tliston |
Centralize your logging - you have no idea how helpful it will be. |
@tliston |
Companies who use the same Windows Local Admin password on large numbers of machines are ripe for picking by malicious insiders |
@tliston |
Developers: Input, even data you think you control, can never be trusted. Consider all input a threat and process accordingly. |
@tliston |
Diligent change management practices have saved more asses than a Beverly Hills plastic surgeon. |
@tliston |
Ensure that user accounts are disabled as part of your termination process. Audit all accounts at least semi-annually for "misses." |
@tliston |
High privilege level accounts should be used only for administrative functions, not for day-to-day activities. |
@tliston |
High privilege level accounts should have kick-ass passwords or two factor authentication. Or both. |
@tliston |
If at all possible, disable password authentication for SSH. SSH is a huge brute force target. Keys are your friend. |
@tliston |
If it plugs into your network, know why. The last thing you ever want to hear an admin say is, "That thing has a web interface?!?" |
@tliston |
Learn how to manipulate text files. Learn how to use sed, cut, wc, and grep as a minimum. Text is your friend. |
@tliston |
Logging authentication failures is NOT enough. Log successes and failures. |
@tliston |
Mr. CxO: Your employees are not a "family." Some are untrustworthy. FYI: Some of the people in your real family are pretty sketchy too. |
@tliston |
Never rely on the fact that you "own" anything: data, a communication path, etc... If you do - I 0wn it, I 0wn you. Trust nothing. |
@tliston |
Nothing is more important to the long-term survivability of your organization than a fully functional backup process. |
@tliston |
Packets to or from RFC-1918 addresses should not be allowed to traverse your border firewall in either direction. |
@tliston |
Passwords are no longer security measures. They are merely speed-bumps. Treat them accordingly. |
@tliston |
Physical access trumps most security measures. |
@tliston |
Remember to always think in terms of "defense in depth." A belt AND suspenders is always better than a belt OR suspenders. |
@tliston |
Shared accounts are never a good idea. |
@tliston |
Telnet, FTP, and any other clear-text protocol developed in simpler, more naive times has no business on a modern network. |
@tliston |
There is no excuse - NONE - not to use full disk encryption on laptops. Data breaches due to lost/stolen laptops are inexcusable. |
@tliston |
Unencrypted WiFi is never secure. WEP = Unencrypted WiFi. Trust me. Stop using it. Now. Really. |
@tliston |
Web Developers: Remove comments from your production website code. They serve NO purpose and can give away too much info. |
@vaudajordan |
Total loss of Sony Breach $171M, I wonder how many salaries, code reviews, software, hardware that could have bought. |
@zanis1 |
Assign only those privileges that are required to do the job. |