Qakbot activity resumes after holiday break

Qakbot activity resumes after holiday break
Introduction Although the botnet infrastructure behind Qakbot was active as we entered this year, we hadn't seen any active campaigns spreading Qakbot. Qakbot had been quiet since a few days before Christmas. We saw no new malicious spam (malspam), and we saw no new Excel spreadsheets that we typically find during active campaigns. It had been relatively quiet for Qakbot until Tuesday 2021-01-19, when we started seeing malicious spam (malspam) pushing Qakbot again. @BushidoToken tweeted about it here. Today's diary examines a Qakbot infection from Tuesday 2021-01-19. Shown above: Flow chart for recent Qakbot activity. The malspam No changes here. Qakbot malspam typically spoofs stolen email chains from previously-infected Windows hosts, and it feeds the data to currently-infected Windows hosts that send new malspam pushing updated files for Qakbot. See the image below for an example from Tuesday 2021-01-19. Shown above: An example of Qakbot malspam from Tuesday 2021-01-19. Shown above: Screenshot from one of the spreadsheets I used to infected a Windows host with Qakbot. Infection traffic See the images below for my analysis of network traffic from the Qakbot infection. Shown above: Traffic from the Qakbot infection filtered in Wireshark. Shown above: Excel macro retrieving the initial DLL file for Qakbot. Shown above: More post-infection activity from the Qakbot-infected Windows host. Shown above: Traffic over TCP port 65400 caused by Trickbot. Shown above: Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic caused by Qakbot (example 1 of 3). Shown above: Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic caused by Qakbot (example 2 of 3). Shown above: Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic caused by Qakbot (example 3 of 3). Forensics on infected Windows host See the images below for my forensic investigation on the infected Windows host. Shown above: Initial Qakbot DLL saved to the infected Windows host. Shown above: Other artifacts from the infected Windows host. Shown above: Windows registry updates caused by Qakbot on the infected host. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) SHA256 hash: 8ebba35fa60f107aa4e19fa39ae831feab4ffb1718bdca016670d3898b2fe4fc File size: 25,543 bytes File name: Complaint_Copy_1206700885_01192021.xlsm File description: Spreadsheet with macro for Qakbot SHA256 hash: f9560829534803161c87666795f0feab028ff484fac5170b515390b50e8050fd File size: 1,545,688 bytes File location: hxxp://senzo-conseil-expat[.]fr/bqkckb/5555555555.jpg File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\KKEEDTT.DEEREDTTDVD File description: Initial DLL for Qakbot Run method: rundll32.exe [filename],DllRegisterServer HTTP request caused by Excel macro to retrieve DLL for Qakbot: 51.210.14[.]58 port 80 - senzo-conseil-expat[.]fr - GET /bqkckb/5555555555.jpg HTTPS traffic from the infected host: 95.76.27[.]6 port 443 185.14.30[.]127 port 443 172.115.177[.]204 port 2222 Web traffic connectivity checks from the infected host (HTTPS traffic): port 443 - www.openssl.org port 443 - api.ipify.org TCP traffic from the infected host: 54.36.108[.]120 port 65400 Connectivity checks to mail servers from the infected host: 172.217.195.109 port 993 - imap.gmail.com 108.177.104.28 port 25 - smtp-relay.gmail.com 108.177.104.28 port 465 - smtp-relay.gmail.com 108.177.104.28 port 587 - smtp-relay.gmail.com 64.29.151.102 port 110 - mail.myfairpoint.net 64.29.151.102 port 143 - mail.myfairpoint.net 74.6.106.29 port 995 - inbound.att.net Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 95.76.27[.]6 over TCP port 443: id-at-countryName=NL id-at-stateOrProvinceName=ED id-at-localityName=Dadoe id-at-organizationName=Letx Uqe Dzcmtewzs Kctonlfg Inc. id-at-commonName=epeivate.biz Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 185.14.30[.]127 over TCP port 443: id-at-countryName=US id-at-stateOrProvinceName=NY id-at-localityName=New York id-at-organizationName=cloudservers03.com id-at-commonName=cloudservers03.com Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 172.115.117[.]204 over TCP port 2222: id-at-countryName=DE id-at-stateOrProvinceName=IQ id-at-localityName=Aeur id-at-organizationName=Cepasduq Nqo Ooifzetkp Mqen id-at-commonName=ltxkvijevns.com Final words A pcap of the infection traffic along with malware (Excel file and DLL) from an infected host can be found here. --- Brad Duncan brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net	Brad 394 Posts ISC Handler Jan 20th 2021
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