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Another 0-Day Exploit - CVE-2006-4777

Published: 2006-09-14
Last Updated: 2006-09-14 20:58:43 UTC
by Deborah Hale (Version: 1)
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We have received word that FrSIRT has issued another advisory on a 0-Day Exploit.  This vulnerability has CVE ID 2006-4777 and appears to be related to Microsoft Internet Explorer and causes a memory corruption and consequential browser crash.  FrSIRT has successfully exploited this vulnerability on a fully patched Windows XP SP2 system.

FrSIRT Advisory for CVE-2006-4777

CVE Advisory
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cisco vtp vulnerabilities

Published: 2006-09-14
Last Updated: 2006-09-14 19:01:25 UTC
by donald smith (Version: 2)
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I should have pointed out these are only exploitable from a local segement.


FX reported three vulnerabilities for cisco vtp.
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/445896/30/0/threaded

Cisco responded with this public response.
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20060913-vtp.shtml

CSCsd34855/CSCei54611 -- Buffer Overflow in VTP VLAN name possible remote code execution.
VTP passwords mitigate this one somewhat as long as the passwords are not easily guessable or well known.

CSCsd52629/CSCsd34759 -- VTP version field DoS
VTP passwords do not mitigate this vulnerability as this takes place before the vtp password would be used.

CSCse40078/CSCse47765 -- Integer Wrap in VTP revision
This one appears to be a cosmetic issue not a DOS.
Cisco was unable to recreate a DOS condition one in their testing.

FX in the original posting provided a text version of the packet needed to perform the buffer overflow in vtp vlan name. That can easily be converted to a pcap. I consider that to be a public release of the exploit.

If you have not set a vtp mode then VTP server is the default mode.
If not set to transparent mode the vtp could be vulnerable depending on code level.

To set a vtp password execute the command

vtp password $PAssw0rd_th@t_15_h@rd_2_guess

From the cisco response:

"Products affected by these vulnerabilities:

Switches running affected versions of Cisco IOSŪ software that have VTP Operating Mode as either "server" or "client" are affected by all three vulnerabilities

Switches running affected versions of Cisco CatOS that have VTP Operating Mode as either "server" or "client" are only affected by the "Integer Wrap in VTP revision" vulnerability

Products not affected by these vulnerabilities:

Switches configured with VTP operating mode as "transparent"

Switches running CatOS with VTP Operating Mode as either "server" or "client" are not affected by the "Buffer Overflow in VTP VLAN name" or "VTP Version field DoS" vulnerabilities"

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Microsoft security patches for September 2006

Published: 2006-09-14
Last Updated: 2006-09-14 17:37:15 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 5)
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Overview of the September 2006 Microsoft patches.

# Affected Known Problems
Known Exploits Microsoft rating ISC rating (*)
clients servers
re-released MS06-040 Server Service

CVE-2006-3439
Re-released to fix known problems

KB921883
Multiple botnets actively exploiting this. Critical
PATCH NOW
PATCH NOW
re-released MS06-042 Internet Explorer (MSIE)

CVE-2006-3280
CVE-2006-3450
CVE-2006-3451
CVE-2006-3637
CVE-2006-3638
CVE-2006-3639
CVE-2006-3640
CVE-2004-1166
CVE-2006-3869
new:

CVE-2006-3873
Re-released to fix  the known problems with MSIE6SP1

KB918899
Well known vulnerabilities
Critical
PATCH NOW
Important
MS06-052 Microsoft Queue System (MSQS) -
Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM)

CVE-2006-3442
No reported problems

KB919007
No known exploits yet
Important
Critical Critical
(**)
MS06-053 Indexing Service

CVE-2006-0032
No reported problems

KB920685
No known exploits yet Moderate
Less urgent
Important
MS06-054 Publisher

CVE-2006-0001
No reported problems

KB910729
No known exploits yet Critical
Critical Less urgent

We will update issues on this page as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY

(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
    • Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
    • Less urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
  • The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leaisure work.
  • The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
  • Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
  • All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems.  There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
(**):  Please note that in accordance with the above this rating assumes your machine used in a typical server role is affected. This has nothing to do with Microsoft's marketing names or product lines. Server applies to the use of the machine. The rating assumes the machine is affected. So yes we consider it a critical problem if you use a MSQS enhanced XP as a server. Please resolv any licensing issues directly with Microsoft, we do not condone violating copyright or licencing agreements.
The key is that the separation between server and client is how you use the machine, we rated the MSIE issues in MS06-042 lower due to most administrators being smart enough never to surf the web on a server. Still, if you installed a windows server license on your laptop and surf the web with it, it is at high risk even if it is a "server" licensed version of the OS.


--
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
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CSO Online E-Crime Survey Results

Published: 2006-09-14
Last Updated: 2006-09-14 17:10:05 UTC
by Deborah Hale (Version: 1)
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CSO Online E-Crime Survey Results

The survey results are in and the findings are quite intriguing (at least to me).  As a Security Administrator for a smaller company I realize what a task it is to implement any kind of security with a very small budget.  It is often difficult to impress on top management the importance of data protection, network protection and getting them to allocate funds for software/hardware to protect the data.

As I reviewed the information in the survey one of the items that jumped out at me, that really caused me to pause and think was the insider breaches that ended in lost revenue/damage.  The different ways that the breaches occurred were all very logical and I guess not so surprising.  When I looked at the reasons that were given for why legal action was not taken I at first was surprised at the high percentage that said "Lack of evidence".  As I began to think about it, began to really think about whether or not we would have enough evidence, I am beginning to rethink my response.  Perhaps I need to really look at my ability to provide evidence in the event that an insider breach does occur. 

I have to say, this is an outstanding survey and I think an outstanding tool for Security/System Administrators to begin to ask themselves the very important question, "How safe is your data?"

I for one am going to use this as a tool for doing a self evaluation.

I want to thank Karen Fogerty at CSO Online for giving me permission to post a link to the survey in today's diary.  Hopefully everyone will take a look at the results of the survey and use it to analyze their own security or lack thereof and the impact that a breach may have on their system.


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