Handler on Duty: Jesse La Grew
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Thursday, April 16th, 2026: AI Credential Scans; Microsoft Update Issues; RDP Warnings; GitHub Action Vulns;
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9894.mp3
My Next Class
Click HERE to learn more about classes Johannes is teaching for SANS
Scanning for AI Models
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Scanning%20for%20AI%20Models/32896
Microsoft Update Problems
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/april-14-2026-kb5082063-os-build-26100-32690-c57e289d-27c9-47cd-a183-72fabc62c5d7#:~:text=Known%20issues%20in%20this%20update
Microsoft RDP File Warnings
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/remotepc/understanding-security-warnings
AI GitHub Action Vulnerabilities
https://oddguan.com/blog/comment-and-control-prompt-injection-credential-theft-claude-code-gemini-cli-github-copilot/
https://www.theregister.com/2026/04/15/claude_gemini_copilot_agents_hijacked/
Wireguard Update
https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/wireguard/2026-April/009561.html
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | San Diego | May 11th - May 16th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Online | Arabian Standard Time | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Riyadh | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Jul 13th - Jul 18th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Online | British Summer Time | Jul 27th - Aug 1st 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 21st - Sep 26th 2026 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Thursday, April 16, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Stockheim, Germany. This episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu graduate Certificate Program in Purple Team Operations. Configuration files containing secrets are a common target for attackers today. Typically, attackers are scanning web servers for commonly used configuration files like .env. Guy noted in his honeypot logs that attackers are now more and more scanning for files associated with AI tools. For example, attackers are scanning for files associated with OpenClaw, Claude and OpenAI. Just like any configuration files, these files should not be kept in your document root. Attackers will usually use the credentials contained in these files to steal tokens, which can lead to rather large invoices from these AI vendors. So make sure that first of all, the secrets are properly protected. But in addition, we'll set up the right billing alerts and limits for your particular AI tools. So that way, you're at least being alerted and hopefully are limiting the damage that's done in case some of these secrets will eventually lead. And then we got some postscripts to yesterday's Microsoft Patch Tuesday. Microsoft states that some devices with an unrecommended BitLocker Group Policy Configuration might require to enter their BitLocker Recovery Key on the first restart after installing this update. So what Microsoft is saying here is that you may have to enter your BitLocker Key, which of course a lot of people don't necessarily have to do. Microsoft is also offering some advice on how to adjust your configuration prior to the update to avoid this problem. This issue may be related to a patch released on Tuesday that specifically addresses a BitLocker related problem. Microsoft also released a known issue rollback. These are essentially little scripts that make it easy to apply their recommended solution to this problem. So again, it is maybe a little bit easier than following the steps that are outlined to revert the configuration before you are applying the update. The Tuesday Microsoft updates also included a patch that I pointed out for the RDP client. One thing I mentioned there is that it's certainly possible for a victim to connect to an RDP server via a simple RDP URL that's included in an email or a web page. Another option is an RDP file. These files may include additional configuration options. For example, the RDP file may instruct the RDP client to share certain files or the clipboard with the server. Malicious users have abused this feature. Once the update is installed, Windows will display a warning after the user opens an RDP file for the first time. This warning will just explain to the user the danger of RDP files in general. But then for each new connection, there will be a dialogue explaining first of all, is the RDP file digitally signed? That is an option or is it not signed? And secondly, what resources the RDP file instructs the client to share with the server? So to give the user a little bit more insight into what is happening when they're actually opening this RDP file. And security researcher Aonan Guan found a new type of prompt injection vulnerability in various GitHub actions distributed by OpenAI vendors like Anthropic, Google and Microsoft. The problem isn't so much the prompt injection in this case, which leads to credential thefts are certainly serious, but prompt injections, well, themselves aren't really all that new. All affected vendors also have updated affected actions and released patched versions. What Aonan Guan however noted is that none of these vendors has assigned a CVE number to the floor or highlighted the security issue that is being addressed in this update. In particular, after recent supply chain issues, of course, around AI-related libraries, many developers have become more cautious about updates and have carefully pinned versions and Git hashes preventing automated updates from taking place. And this is even more important for vendors now to actually disclose any patched vulnerabilities. The vulnerability itself is not a big surprise. Again, prompt injection sort of comes with the territory here to some extent. But the issue here is more that vendors didn't disclose the vulnerability. Other vendors may be affected as well. These are just the vendors that Aonan Guan has tested in this particular work. And on Friday, I talked about how a number of vendors who released open source security-relevant tools like WireGuard and other VPN service and the like have had issues with Microsoft suspending their developer accounts. After some forth and back, in part via social media, it turned out that affected developers either did misrequest to update their information with Microsoft or in some cases Microsoft may have, well, not properly processed whatever information was submitted. This was in part required because these security-relevant tools will need some of these newer kernel access methods and such. So that requires additional verification as to who actually publishes the software. Not having, of course, any kind of easy-to -reach support or so hasn't helped with the issue. The problem appears now to be resolved. Microsoft and WireGuard, actually, WireGuard was one of the affected developers, did release a new version and has had it now properly signed by Microsoft. So all their drivers should be working going forward. Well, and that's it for today. Thanks for listening. Thanks for liking. Thanks for subscribing. Thanks for recommending this podcast to others. And talk to you again tomorrow. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Thank you.





