Handler on Duty: Xavier Mertens
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Wednesday, March 4th, 2026: CrushFTP Brute Force; Android Patches 0-Day; 0Auth Phishing Abuse
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Bruteforce Scans for CrushFTP
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Bruteforce%20Scans%20for%20CrushFTP%20/32762
Android March 2026 Patches, including 0-Day (CVE-2026-21385)
https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-03-01
OAuth redirection abuse enables phishing and malware delivery
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/02/oauth-redirection-abuse-enables-phishing-malware-delivery/
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
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| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Jul 13th - Jul 18th 2026 |
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Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Wednesday, March 4th, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Centers Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu undergraduate certificate program in applied cybersecurity. Today's diary is about, well, some brute force attacks against Crush FTP. Actually, I'm not sure if I should even call it a brute force attack. It's really more just looking for common default passwords. However, I just want to put a couple of things clear here. First of all, this is not a vulnerability in Crush FTP. There have been significant vulnerabilities in the past. This is not one of them. All they're looking for is for users who set up Crush FTP with an admin user of Crush Admin and a password of Crush Admin. I went through the setup of Crush FTP. And as you're setting it up, it basically asks you, hey, you know, what is the username you want to use for Crush FTP, for the admin user? In the documentation, Crush Admin is one out of a few that they recommend kind of that you use for a username. However, there is no default or recommended password. So really, if you're picking the password Crush Admin, it's on you. It's your mistake. It's nothing really that Crush FTP really did wrong here, other than maybe they should prevent some really stupid passwords like that. And today is also Android patch Tuesday. So with that, we got patches from Google for 140 different vulnerabilities. Noteworthy here is one vulnerability that affects the Qualcomm display drivers. And this particular vulnerability is already exploited in the wild. And well, it's one of those memory management issues. They have released a patch for it now with this update. So make sure that you're keeping your Android phones updated, even though it, as I always say, may take a while for these patches to actually show up for you, depending on what particular phone you have and what carrier you're using. When people talk about OAuth, they often get lost sort of in some of the little technical details, whether to use proof keys and the like. And while all of this is important, there's really sort of one big problem with OAuth. And that's user perception. Basically, how the user really perceives all these redirects and permissions and prompts and such they're being faced with as they're logging in via OAuth. Microsoft now documented a phishing campaign that takes advantage of some of that confusion. What they're doing is they're basically using the OAuth redirect URL. And what happens here is that the attacker is basically presenting a link as part of phishing email that links to a legitimate Microsoft website in this case, which is their OAuth endpoint. But of course, the rest of the OAuth authentication data is invalid. They do present a redirect URI. And well, what OAuth does is if it can't make sense of the request, it'll just send you back to the redirect URI, which then is the phishing page. Since the user originally clicked on something that was a valid Microsoft link, they are now much more likely to fall for the phishing attack because they may not necessarily revalidate the URL after all these redirects are done, which of course are usually invisible to the user. So the end effect here is that the victim is then being tricked into downloading malware from a website that's absolutely not affiliated with Microsoft. So your classic sort of malware style phishing attack. And then this malware does install various spyware credentials dealers or whatever the attacker came up with in this case. And just a reminder about something that I have covered here, I think last week, and that's Google API keys. It used to be that Google API keys weren't supposed to be secrets and that you could easily include them in JavaScript, in various Android or other apps on decline. That has changed since Google's AI offerings were released. And we now have victims that basically got stuck with bills of tens of thousands of dollars for exposing their API key. So please double check if you are exposing these API keys, either invalidate them or refer to Google's documentation on how to properly secure them. But yes, this is an ongoing issue. Thank you.





