XLSB Files: Because Binary is Stealthier Than XML
In one of his last diaries[1], Brad mentioned an Excel sheet named with a .xlsb extension. Now, it was my turn to find one... What's the magic behind this file extension? "XLS" means that we are facing an Excel sheet and "B" means that we have a binary workbook file. Within the current Microsoft office files format, data are stored in XML. In this case, they are stored in binary. For Microsoft Office, to open a normal or binary file is the same... but for an attacker, the plus-value is the increased level of obfuscation! Indeed, it's more difficult to extract interesting information like... strings!
When you open the file, you see a classic message asking you to enable macros:
Let's have a look at the document:
remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20220324$ oledump.py luamccsbuaraeos.xlsb Warning: no OLE file was found inside this ZIP container (OPC)
No VBA macro found! Let's check the content of the file and look for a potential Excel 4 macro:
remnux@remnux:/mnt/hgfs/MalwareZoo/20220324$ zipdump.py luamccsbuaraeos.xlsb
Index Filename Encrypted Timestamp
1 [Content_Types].xml 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
2 _rels/.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
3 xl/_rels/workbook.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
4 xl/workbook.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
5 xl/worksheets/sheet1.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
6 xl/worksheets/sheet2.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
7 xl/worksheets/sheet3.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
8 xl/worksheets/sheet4.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
9 xl/macrosheets/intlsheet1.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
10 xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
11 xl/macrosheets/sheet2.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
12 xl/theme/theme1.xml 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
13 xl/media/image1.png 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
14 xl/styles.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
15 xl/drawings/drawing1.xml 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
16 xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet1.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
17 xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet2.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
18 xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet3.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
19 xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet4.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
20 xl/macrosheets/_rels/intlsheet1.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
21 xl/macrosheets/_rels/sheet1.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
22 xl/macrosheets/_rels/sheet2.bin.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
23 xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
24 xl/sharedStrings.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
25 xl/worksheets/binaryIndex1.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
26 xl/worksheets/binaryIndex2.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
27 xl/worksheets/binaryIndex3.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
28 xl/worksheets/binaryIndex4.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
29 xl/macrosheets/binaryIndex1.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
30 xl/macrosheets/binaryIndex2.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
31 xl/macrosheets/binaryIndex3.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
32 xl/printerSettings/printerSettings1.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
33 xl/printerSettings/printerSettings2.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
34 xl/calcChain.bin 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
35 docProps/core.xml 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
36 docProps/app.xml 0 1980-01-01 00:00:00
As you can see, no XML files but ".bin" files but some streams disclose the presence of macros:
xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin xl/macrosheets/_rels/intlsheet1.bin.rels xl/sharedStrings.bin
sharedStrings.bin is a very good indicator! Let's dump it:
remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20220324$ zipdump.py luamccsbuaraeos.xlsb -s 24 -a | more 00000000: 9F 01 08 17 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 13 07 00 01 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 58 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 64 00 13 07 00 ..X........d.... 00000020: 01 00 00 00 22 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 3A 00 13 ...."........:.. 00000030: 07 00 01 00 00 00 3D 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 2C ......=........, 00000040: 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 5C 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 ........\....... 00000050: 00 43 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 41 00 13 07 00 01 .C........A..... 00000060: 00 00 00 2E 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 4C 00 13 07 ............L... 00000070: 00 01 00 00 00 26 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 .....&........(. 00000080: 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 55 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 .......U........ 00000090: 2D 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 29 00 13 07 00 01 00 -........)...... 000000A0: 00 00 54 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 52 00 13 07 00 ..T........R.... 000000B0: 01 00 00 00 45 00 13 07 00 01 00 00 00 4E 00 13 ....E........N.. 000000C0: D9 01 00 6A 00 00 00 22 00 68 00 22 00 26 00 22 ...j...".h.".&." 000000D0: 00 74 00 74 00 70 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 73 00 3A .t.t.p.".&.".s.: 000000E0: 00 2F 00 2F 00 6D 00 61 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 6E ././.m.a.".&.".n 000000F0: 00 61 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 72 00 65 00 22 00 26 .a.".&.".r.e.".& 00000100: 00 22 00 73 00 74 00 61 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 75 .".s.t.a.".&.".u 00000110: 00 72 00 61 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 6E 00 74 00 22 .r.a.".&.".n.t." 00000120: 00 26 00 22 00 65 00 2E 00 63 00 22 00 26 00 22 .&.".e...c.".&." 00000130: 00 6F 00 6D 00 2F 00 44 00 6E 00 22 00 26 00 22 .o.m./.D.n.".&." 00000140: 00 69 00 35 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 4C 00 36 00 46 .i.5.".&.".L.6.F 00000150: 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 4D 00 4C 00 22 00 26 00 22 .".&.".M.L.".&." 00000160: 00 65 00 56 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 32 00 2F 00 4E .e.V.".&.".2./.N 00000170: 00 68 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 66 00 6E 00 76 00 22 .h.".&.".f.n.v." 00000180: 00 26 00 22 00 68 00 2E 00 70 00 6E 00 22 00 26 .&.".h...p.n.".& 00000190: 00 22 00 67 00 22 00 2C 00 22 00 13 DF 01 00 6D .".g.".,.".....m 000001A0: 00 00 00 22 00 68 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 74 00 22 ...".h.".&.".t." 000001B0: 00 26 00 22 00 74 00 70 00 22 00 26 00 22 00 73 .&.".t.p.".&.".s
We have URLs:
hxxps://manarestaurante[.]com/Dni5L6FMLeV2/Nhfnvh.png hxxps://hondadominicana[.]com/vAXoUmZFeV2B/Nhfnvh.png hxxps://shlokahujafilms[.]com/Xz6RyJCaHMP/Nhfnvh.png
Probably, the macro will loop across the three URLs and try to fetch the next stage. The payload is a DLL file. Like in Brad's diary, it's a Qakbot[2] sample!
If you would like to have a look at the macro, the easiest way is to open the XLSB file in Excel and save it as an XLSM file. You don't need to activate macros to perform this operation but do this always in a sandbox.
Now, you'll be able to address the file as usual:
remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20220324$ zipdump.py luamccsbuaraeos.xlsm -s 4 -d | xmldump.py pretty
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships">
<fileVersion appName="xl" lastEdited="4" lowestEdited="6" rupBuild="4505"/>
<workbookPr/>
<bookViews>
<workbookView windowHeight="11160" windowWidth="20730" xWindow="-120" yWindow="-120"/>
</bookViews>
<sheets>
<sheet name="Sheet" r:id="rId1" sheetId="1"/>
<sheet name="Rgvrb" r:id="rId2" sheetId="2" state="hidden"/>
<sheet name="Evsrg" r:id="rId3" sheetId="3" state="hidden"/>
<sheet name="Lgle" r:id="rId4" sheetId="4" state="hidden"/>
<sheet name="NUEVD" r:id="rId5" sheetId="5" state="hidden"/>
<sheet name="Rc" r:id="rId6" sheetId="6" state="hidden"/>
<sheet name="Rcc" r:id="rId7" sheetId="7" state="hidden"/>
</sheets>
<definedNames>
<definedName function="1" hidden="1" name="_xlfn.ARABIC" xlm="1">#NAME?</definedName>
<definedName name="_xlnm.Auto_Open">NUEVD!$F$1</definedName>
</definedNames>
<calcPr calcId="124519"/>
<fileRecoveryPr repairLoad="1"/>
</workbook>
In conclusion, we have now a new file extension to keep an eye on! These XLSB files have interesting features[3]...
[1] https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Qakbot+infection+with+Cobalt+Strike+and+VNC+activity/28448
[2] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.qakbot
[3] https://analystcave.com/excel-working-with-large-excel-files-the-xlsb-format/
Xavier Mertens (@xme)
Xameco
Senior ISC Handler - Freelance Cyber Security Consultant
PGP Key
Comments
Anonymous
Dec 3rd 2022
9 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 3rd 2022
9 months ago
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<a hreaf="https://technolytical.com/">the social network</a> is not interested in collecting data about you. They don't care about what you're doing, or what you like. They don't want to know who you talk to, or where you go. The social networks only collect the minimum amount of information required for the service that they provide. Your personal information is kept private, and is never shared with other companies without your permission
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
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<a hreaf="https://defineprogramming.com/the-public-bathroom-near-me-find-nearest-public-toilet/"> public bathroom near me</a>
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
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<a hreaf="https://defineprogramming.com/the-public-bathroom-near-me-find-nearest-public-toilet/"> public bathroom near me</a>
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
https://defineprogramming.com/
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
distribute malware. Even if the URL listed on the ad shows a legitimate website, subsequent ad traffic can easily lead to a fake page. Different types of malware are distributed in this manner. I've seen IcedID (Bokbot), Gozi/ISFB, and various information stealers distributed through fake software websites that were provided through Google ad traffic. I submitted malicious files from this example to VirusTotal and found a low rate of detection, with some files not showing as malware at all. Additionally, domains associated with this infection frequently change. That might make it hard to detect.
https://clickercounter.org/
https://defineprogramming.com/
Dec 26th 2022
8 months ago
rthrth
Jan 2nd 2023
8 months ago