Last Updated: 2007-12-12 16:56:27 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 4)
Overview of the December 2007 Microsoft patches and their status.
|#||Affected||Contra Indications||Known Exploits||Microsoft rating||ISC rating(*)|
|MS07-063||An unspecified vulnerability in the implementation of the SMBv2 signing allows attackers to recompute signatures.|
|KB 942624||No publicly known exploits||Important||Important||Important|
|MS07-064||Input validation failures in DirectShow allows code execution through common file types.
|KB 941568||No publicly known exploits||Critical||Critical||Important|
|MS07-065||A buffer overflow allows code execution with system privileges.
|Message queuing (MSMQ)
|KB 937894||Exploit available in for pay program||Important||Important||Important|
|MS07-066||The advanced local procedure call (ALPC) allows allows escalation of privileges.|
|KB 943078||No publicly known exploits||Important||Important||Important|
|MS07-067||Macrovision's secdrv.sys (part of SafeDisk, a copyright enforcing scheme using a driver to allow original disks of games to run) allows privilege escalation.|
|KB 944653||Actively exploited||Important||Critical||Important|
|MS07-068||ASF, WMV, WMA input validation failures allow code execution.
|Windows Media Format
|No publicly known exploits||Critical||Critical||Important|
|MS07-069||Multiple vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer allow remote code execution.
|KB 942615||Actively exploited||Critical||PATCH NOW||Important|
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
- We use 4 levels:
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
Swa Frantzen -- Gorilla Security
Last Updated: 2007-12-11 23:18:58 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 3)
Greg wrote in to ask how to protect users in his organization from getting infected with malware by visiting websites for business reasons that got hacked.
So went looking for success stories with our audience and you came up with:
[note the product names are jus those mentioned by our readeres, nothing more needs to be sought in the mention]
- Wendy writes her organization is successfully using a host based IDS/IPS system (Third Brigade's Deep Security Manager) that is loaded on each client and resets the connection when a malware site is encountered. She writes: "We have been able to identify sites that have not been previously noted as containing malicious code, including valid sites that have been compromised. This product works on roaming equipment, as it "calls home" once reconnected to the network, and reports in on possible compromises that we investigate, when alerted." The ability to protect those laptops on the move seems to be a real plus of such a solution.
- Ray writes in to tell us they block executables in the perimeter. They do allow IT to download executables though. Ray writes: "All HTTP is scanned by a virus scanner even for IT. By preventing staff from being able to download executable content you can very effectively prevent malware from infecting their computers. It's a political battle but worth fighting for."
- Blaze is along the same line using "a FortiGate product at our borders for IPS/IDS/AV protection. The firewall is capable of border level IPS/IDS as well as content filtering for known Malware and Spyware sites".
- Angus suggested: "Try running IE as a limited user using DropMyRights from or CPAU from ... either should limit the ability of malware to do damage." Mark adds along the same lines: "What about running the browser in a sandbox, e.g. SandboxIE?".
- Walter has an interesting approach in using "Proxomitron to filter web-traffic. But the problem with any filter is the ruleset. How can we filter something we do not know?And what about whitelists? Anyone tries to minimize CPU usage of filter software and uses whitelists. Do we need a plan how to verify our whitelists form time to time?". Interesting questions indeed as trusted websites can (and will) get compromised too.
- Mark suggests to consider "setting "Launching programs and files in an IFRAME" to Disable instead, since TTBOMK most of these site hacks involve malicious code in IFRAMEs?".
- The obvious products of websense have been mentioned as well as the database of stopbadware.org
Thanks to all writing in with suggestions.
Swa Frantzen -- Gorilla Security
Last Updated: 2007-12-11 21:11:01 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)
In the past we've written about the risks involved in using Teredo (like e.g. Microsoft's Vista does). It effectively makes machines behind a NAT gateway addressable from the Internet. Proponents will say that Vista doesn't start it until needed, and that the IPv6 address space is too big to scan. Well, all it takes is a hit on a IPv6 web server to both start it and to know where the client is.
It seems this opinion is now propagated and elaborated in an internet draft over at the IETF:
Recommended reading material.
Just a reminder: block UDP port 3544 on your IPv4 perimeter to stop the tunnels from being created.
Swa Frantzen -- Gorilla Security