Threat Level: green Handler on Duty: Jan Kopriva

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Honeypot Mirroring .edu domains under .eu / Active Threat

Published: 2006-11-16
Last Updated: 2006-11-16 20:50:04 UTC
by John Bambenek (Version: 1)
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The .eu top-level domain is relatively new and in the build-up phase and had a co-worker notice something fun.

When ssh'ing to a local server, he typo'd and finished the DNS name as .eu, it connected with an SSH handshake (it was a new server so the key warning wasn't considered a big deal) and took a password. The individual immediately recognized the problem when the password wasn't accepted and we investigated.

It appears any DNS name at would resolve to this machine.  Not only that, but the machine in question was hosting at least 7 other domains under .eu that would map to an educational institution. For instance, for "fake" educational institution at you could search for and get a response to this machine.

response: (good)

response: (bad)

nslookup (XXX = anything whether or not it exists on the .edu side)
response: (bad)

It appears that this machine will take anything from certain domains and resolve it, whether or not the dnsname actually exists on your end. (i.e. wildcard)

What is appears, for the moment, is that this machine is running a honeypot to capture passwords for people who typo .edu as .eu.  However, with a little ingenuity they could turn this enterprise into something truly evil. Right now it is only running a few token services and the webpage appears to be hosting "non-content". There are some who think this is "legit".

With this main .edu's pointing to the same place to a box with non-content, I'm not buying it. Incidents like this are a good reason to be cautious, particularly when the mitigation is as non-involved as it is.


Check your .edu to see if it resolves as an .eu (i.e. nslookup and see what happens).

If you get, they are mirroring your .edu.

Filter that IP in both directions and pursue what other avenues your lawyers think necessary (i.e. lock down the .eu equivalent of your domain).

I'm interested in how wide-spread this is, and would like a report if your .edu is affected.

John Bambenek
bambenek /at/ gmail [dot] com
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Bot C&C Servers on Port 80

Published: 2006-11-16
Last Updated: 2006-11-16 16:22:48 UTC
by Johannes Ullrich (Version: 2)
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We do see more and more bots that use port 80 for their C&C channel. This will make these bots harder to detect. However, these are IRC servers, so its not that hard to distinguish them from HTTP traffic.

Couple tricks that may help:

  • Implement a proxy server to filter outbound port 80 traffic. This is a good idea anyway as it may help you to implement additional filtering for web traffic as well.
  • If you suspect an IRC server on port 80 in your own network, a quick scan with nmap (version 4 and later) can help:

nmap -A -p 80 (The '-A' option will look for service banners)

Interesting ports on 10.0.0.a:
80/tcp open tcpwrapped <--- expect this from devices
using web admin interfaces.

Interesting ports on 10.0.0.b:
80/tcp open http? <--- this server is running apache
with customized headers.

Interesting ports on 10.0.0.c:
80/tcp open irc ircu ircd <--- this server is running IRC!
Service Info: Host: megaserver

  • implement a snort rule to look for IRC traffic on port 80. Snorts 'chat.rules' has a number of rules to detect IRC, but they are limited to port 6666:7000 by default. Make sure you get the latest version. You need to use the "registration required but free" rules.

If you don't want to deal with the legal issues of Sourcefire's "VRT" rules, use the  Bleedingthreats rules: IRC Policy Rules, Trojan/Bot IRC rules.

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Microsoft Black Tuesday Overview

Published: 2006-11-16
Last Updated: 2006-11-16 14:53:36 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 8)
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Overview of the November 2006 Microsoft patches and their status.

# Affected Contra Indications Known Exploits Microsoft rating ISC rating(*)
clients servers
MS06-066 Netware client services - remote code execution & DoS

No known problems

KB 923980
PoC exploits available in for pay program
Important Less Urgent Less Urgent
MS06-067 Internet Explorer - remote code execution

No known problems

KB 922760
Actively exploited on websites in the wild

Critical PATCH NOW Important
MS06-068 Microsoft Agent - remote code execution

No known problems

KB 920213
No known exploits
Critical Critical Less Urgent
MS06-069 Adobe flash player - remote code execution

No known problems

KB 923789
No known exploits
Critical Critical Less Urgent
MS06-070 Workstation service - remote code execution

No known problems

KB 924270
Vulnerability details are public ;
Exploit publicly available
MS06-071 XML Core services

No known problems

KB 928088
KB 927977
KB 927978
Exploits publicly available
Critical PATCH NOW Important

We will update issues on this page as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY

(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
    • Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
    • Less urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
  • The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
  • The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
  • Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
  • All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
(**): Of the supported versions of windows this is mainly affecting Windows 2000. The vulnerability exists on Windows XP, to a lesser degree and seems to be absent from Windows 2003.

Swa Frantzen -- Section 66

Keywords: mspatchday
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Microsoft patch troubles ?

Published: 2006-11-16
Last Updated: 2006-11-16 12:39:05 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)
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Reboot wednesday passed with just a few isolated reports of trouble with the patches.

We would like to remind our readers we are interested in problems with patches. It's one of those cases where a community sharing such information as soon as possible can really work wonders.

  • Do not forget to report such trouble back to Microsoft as well, it's the best way to get them to do something about it, and that kind of support is free.
    In the US call 1-866-PCSAFETY.
    Other coutries need to look it up on the Microsoft website, but it should be free just as well. [Fill in the country and then look in the column to the right]
  • Do not wait for others to go first. We're all interested in not being the first ones to hit the bump in the road. Unfortunately this results in increasingly longer periods of just waiting and being exposed to the bad guys. Those bad guys are not waisting a second in getting their exploits out there, either actively using it, either selling the exploit itself.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
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