Looking for malicious traffic in electrical SCADA networks - part 2 - solving problems with DNP3 Secure Authentication Version 5
Last Updated: 2014-04-17 20:25:34 UTC
by Manuel Humberto Santander Pelaez (Version: 1)
I received this week a very valuable e-mail from the DNP Technical Committee Chair, Mr. Adrew West, who pointed an excellent observation and it's the very slow adoption of DNP3 Secure Authentication Version 5, which is the latest security enhancement for the DNP3 protocol. I want to talk today about this standard and the advantages of adopting it into your DNP3 SCADA system.
This standard has two specific objectives:
- Help DNP3 outstation to determine beyond any reasonable doubt that it's communicating with an authorized user.
- Help DNP3 master to determine beyound any reasonable doubt that it's communicating to the correct outstation.
This standard minimize the following risks:
- Spoofing to outstation or master: Since the original specification includes only the DNP3 outstation address as the only way for identification, the new standard uses crypto keys to enforce the authentication to each end.
- Modification: The standard includes the concept of Message Authentication Code (MAC) as shown in ISO/IEC 9798-4. This standard allows to determine if a message has been modified before arriving to the destination, ensuring integrity.
- Replay attack: Valid traffic cannot be retransmitted anymore by any third party as authentication information would not be the same.
- Eavesdropping: Crypto keys are securely exchanged. Data being transmitted goes still in clear-text, so confidentiality is not ensured. You need additional gear like crypto-boxes on each end of the communication link.
The following diagram shows the implementation architecture for this standard:
|DNP Application Layer|
|DNP Secure Authentication|
|DNP Transport Function|
|DNP Data Link Layer|
|Serial||Internet Protocol Suite|
As seen, an additional level before application layer is added, providing the new security features.Unfortunately, there are two specific reasons that is preventing this standard for being widely deployed in the world:
- ICS systems are still being planned to last from 10 to 20 years: Technology has arrived to that world and most ICS people have not noticed that yet. They still think that air gap is enough to protect the ICS systems and won't consider new investements to implement new security features. United States is one of the leaders in regulation for critical infrastructure. However, this does not happen in most countries and unless governments produce new laws for enforcing cybersecurity on critical infrastructure, adoption of such standards will keep slow.
- DNP3 equipment manufacturers do not offer the same references and features in all countries of the world, and most of them even claim that this standard is not yet supported (for example, in south america).
Cybersecurity is not still mature in the ICS industry and has a long way to go. Information Security Professionals working with the ICS world has a really big challenge: We need to demonstrate that Information Security Controls like this standard will have a return of investment to the company and the risk of not having them, if operating a critical infrastructure to a Country, could be catastrophic and impacts incalculable. This standard works, won't put at risk any ICS facility and we all have a responsability of ensuring its implementation to our companies.
Manuel Humberto Santander Peláez
SANS Internet Storm Center - Handler
e-mail: msantand at isc dot sans dot org
Apr 17th 2014
9 years ago